Saturday, May 5, 2012

Simplicity


            I had been looking forward to reading this book, Milestones, all semester because of how many times the text came up during my History of the Modern Middle East course. However, reading it and comparing that to my memory of its impact, I felt disjointed—at first.
            See, I had expected something incredibly elaborate, something utterly mind-blowing, something that would change the way I engaged the world, even as a non-Muslim. However, if anything, I was irritated. Irritated at how Sayyid Qutb was over simplifying everything to a point where there was no longer full truth, only a mismatch of partial truths. It wasn’t until class that evening that I began to unravel my irritation; I was irritated at the sheer simplicity of it.
            I’ve read the theories of Tahtawi, Afghani, Abduh, and Rida about Islam, modernism, globalization and the West.  I’ve watched them wrestle with the same questions. I know the time period is different and Qutb was dealing with a much different mess, but simplicity, gah simplicity is so dangerous. Nothing is simple and the simpler something is or appears to be the more its leaving out. Now, are the things we’re leaving out worthy of being left out? Maybe. But shouldn’t we get the choice?
            Simplicity. Simplicity is dangerous. Simplicity is luring. Simplicity is the thing that Sayyid Qutb is creating.
            Qutb is relying upon simplicity so that his writings won’t be questioned. Look at how fast it was and is gobbled up. You can’t walk into a bookstore and purchase it because they are sold out as soon as they get copies. Simplicity is desirable. In a world where depth is unearthed about absolutely everything, to see a simple offering is understandably enticing. However, Qutb takes advantage of a need of the people.  Other theologians work hard to grapple and wrestle with the difficulties of the faith and perceived collaborations with modernity and globalization. Qutb doesn’t.
            With all this said, I cannot look at his work objectively. All I see is a man who ignores grey, probably for his own benefit, because grey would challenge many of his own conceptions and creations. A man unwilling to do such is irritating to me. Not questioning and forcing complicated ideas into a simplified format is vastly dangerous. Qutb is creating and enforcing this danger with his text. That loses him respect in my book. The thoughts and work of Tahtawi, Afghani, Rida and Abduh are far more respectable as they work hard to grapple. Grappling is hard but worthy.

WHB


Friday, May 4, 2012

Islamic Thinkers


         Success and prosperity are two things that people, communities, and nations are after and desire. Prosperity is the sign of success and success means that you’re good that whatever methods you are utilizing are working. It is a good thing. You, everyone, wants to be successful. The pressure to be a success builds if someone near or around you is doing really well. The pressure to do better or at least as good begins to build and you begin to feel desperate. You look at what you’re doing trying to figure out what it is that you’re doing that is not working. You begin to question what you’re doing. You begin to think that copying or at least modeling what the successful nations beside you are doing will help you do better. But it doesn’t.
         I researched 3 prominent Islamic thinkers: Tahtawi, Afghani, and Abduh. Each man tackled problems occuring globally and nationally in Egypt.  Responses to the predicament varied. Rulers frequently tried to adopt to French or British methods of operation from schooling to military tactics. However, there were a group of individuals who sought to rectify the predicament. The problem, as they saw it, was a perceived incompatibility between Islam and modernity. Thus,these men began to explain and elaborate on how and why Islam and modernity are easily, nay naturally, compatible. Each of these men built upon the previous thinker’s thoughts and led a revolution in thinking and engagement. Now, these three men each have a focus in Egypt and thus the focus of this paper will share their focus on Egypt—also, Egypt was independent enough to have multiple and plentiful interactions with European powers, which spurred dialogue about modernity and its compatibility with Islam. 
    Something interesting about how these men approached modernity is through the assumption that France and Britain had it. And this belief lead to them comparing themselves to the West frequently. For instance,  Afghani felt that if Islam was to be the solution for so many problems that Islam was in need of a reformation—similar to the Protestant reformation, which lead to (or closely proceeded) many advancements in Europe—and actually felt that he was the reformer or an Islamic version of Luther[1]. One of the reasons that Afghani felt that Islam could carry similar impact, as Protestantism to France and Britain, is that “Islam teaches reason is capable of knowing all and testing all[2].” All of which proposes that Islam is inherently a match for modernity as if they are keenly designed to work together to produce positive and effective results. It is interesting, however, that Afghani simultaneously wants reform and believes that Islam is naturally and already a complimentary fit with modernity.
 Afghani was definitely interesting, as was Tahtawi, but its really brilliant watching these two influences come into life in Abduh.  Abduh’s engagement of Islam was definitely different than his predecessors—a unique blend of Tahtawi and Afghani, despite only learning directly from Afghani. In Abduh’s mind, Islam was best when a) preserving unity and social peace of the umma and b) answering the questions posed by the religious debates of Europe[1]. More specifically, “Abduh’s purpose [was] to show that Islam contained in itself the potentialities of this rational religion, this social science and moral code which could serve as the basis of modern life; and to create the elite who should guard and interpret it[2].” The elite is a reformed, like what Tahtawi and Afghani were after, umma and ulama. Abduh was concerned with rationality because of his interactions with Renan. Renan was a scholar in France who had a very orientalist view of Arabs and Islam. Abduh was often in debates with him. One of Renan’s comments that riled Abduh was that religion, including religion, was impossible of rational thinking[3]. Abduh felt very strongly against this notion. Instead Abduh became very focused in proving that Islam the opposite—that Islam is indeed very rational[4]. “Reason is free[5]” and since reason/rationality is found in Islam then Islam can act as the medium to free the people.
It seems that it always comes down to freedom: freedom from being in the shadow of the prosperous and successful Britain and France. These thinkers wanted to close the gap. Their thoughts, preachings, and writings inspired so many after them. However, did it work? One might be able to make an argument, but by general assessment the gap that these men wanted to close, they were unable to do so—so far no one has. Tahtawi was certainly right, though, states rise and fall, but there must be something else that contributes to a society’s success or failure other than the things that men can put their hands on. Maybe there’s some luck in the universe.

WHB 


[1] (Hourani, Muhammad 'Abduh 1962)
[2] (Hourani, Muhammad 'Abduh 1962)
[3] (Hourani, Muhammad 'Abduh 1962)
[4] (Hourani, Muhammad 'Abduh 1962)
[5] (Hourani, Muhammad 'Abduh 1962)


[1] (Hourani, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani 1962)
[2] (Hourani, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani 1962)

Thursday, May 3, 2012

Reflections on Milestones

 I had been looking forward to reading Sayyid Qutb's Milestones since learning about its importance to so much of the Muslim world last semester in our History of the Modern Middle East class, but I was not aware of how it would effect my perception of the religion. The book's message is interesting to me because of the different ways in which it has been used, interpreted and banned throughout the past century. In a class like Islam, Modernity and Globalization, I think it's important to view a text's relevance to subject not only in terms of its message and applicability, but also in its global reach. Those who view Islam as a civilization or a cultural phenomenon limited to a certain space of the globe, as Rossa discusses, do not do justice to the issues Qutb chooses to focus on.

As a Peace and Global Studies major, what interests me most in the intersection of Islam and "modernity" is the influence of global capitalism within the Islamic sphere. I'm writing my paper on Islam as a challenge to global capitalism in part because of Qutb, whose slim volume details the reasons and methods for a challenge to global capitalism, although maybe not in those words.

He begins with, “Mankind today is on the brink of a precipice, not because of the danger of complete annihilation which is hanging over its head—this being just a symptom and not the real disease—but because humanity is devoid of those vital values which are necessary not only for its healthy development but also for its really progress.” The vital values that he thinks Western civilization lacks are obvious to everyone he says, in that the Western world has been unable to provide values that justify its existence or its conscience. He provides an adaptive Muslim society as a model for change, keeping the benefits of modern technology but also fulfilling basic human needs through a faith-based way of life.


As many people, especially in the US, think that there are already Muslim societies, and fear what they seem to be, Qutb's assertion that even what we think are Islamic civilizations are Jahiliya presents an interesting argument. “Our whole environment, people’s beliefs and ideas, habits and art, rules and laws—is Jahiliyyah, even to the extent that what we consider to be Islamic culture, Islamic sources, Islamic philosophy and Islamic thought are also constructs of Jahiliyyah!” This is what I intend to explore in my paper.
 

Wednesday, May 2, 2012

Understanding the Arab Spring: On Being Young and Muslim gave the answer

I thought the selection of the readings to conclude our IMG course were perfect since it spoke from a youth perspective and help understand the recent Arab uprisings from insiders point of view.
The three selections that talked about Muslim youth from three countries experiences Egypt, Morocco and France prove wrong the assumptions that the social and economic injustices lead the radicalization of young Muslims. Examples from Morocco and Egypt showed us that Muslim youth choose to accommodate Islam in their identity differently. There is also a clear understanding and differentiation between religion and politics. In Morocco the large distance between the ideas (or beliefs) and act (or commitment) illustrate a great example of how religion is part of the private life and how youth choose to avoid mixing religion with politics.
Youth in Morocco choose their self-interests over worshiping God which is a widely present trend in the Middle East.
Overall, I thought the three selections in class spoke from very truthful sources which exposed us to realities rather than theories. We also were able to connect the accommodation of the youth of Islam to many aspects of modernity that we have been examining during the course. In other terms, the youth stances toward the religion of Islam and government are very modern because they seek, although with limited means such as internet, to bring about change.
The readings also gave a great exposure to the definition of youth and youthfulness and how these two share similarities and differences with their global counterparts.
I was really glad that this course ended with a very fruitful discussion about a pretty sensitive topic that drawns many scholars and media attentions.

                                                                                                                                S.A.A

Some Final Thoughts

Here are a couple of final thoughts I have from the course this semester:


·         In my last post, I talked about my final paper (5/2/12, titled "My Final Paper: Globalization, Deterritorialization, and Gender"). One overall conclusion I draw in this paper is that Islam is not inherently misogynist. I realized that this conclusion is very similar to what Mahmood Mamdani talks about in the article "Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A Political Perspective on Culture and Terrorism." In this article, Mamdani writes that "culture talk" creates easy categories: "good Muslims" and "bad Muslims." "Good Muslims"  are moderate and modernized – i.e. are more Westernized. "Bad Muslims," on the other hand, are traditional and fundamentalist and interpret the Quran literally. A common assumption is that Bad Muslims have the dominant voice in Islam. But this is not actually the case. In my paper, I argue a very similar thing. Muslims do wrestle with various social and theological issues. Gender relations is one of these issues. Some Muslim sects and individuals reach conservative conclusions, and reach more progressive conclusions. Therefore I, like Mamdani, challenge the dominant discourse of Muslim misogyny.


·         In the article "CyberResistance: Saudi Opposition between Globalization and Localization," Mamoun Fandy talks about the encounter of Saudi society with various globalization processes. Among other things, Fandy argues that the modern world has compressed time and space (p. 124). This compression entails the creation of a "hyperreal state" – that is, the delinking of state from physical territory (pp. 125, 140). When reading this, I was immediately struck by the similarity between the concept of hyperreal state and the concept of deterritorialization. Arjun Appadurai talks about deterritorialization in his book Modernity at Large. He defines it as "the loosening of the holds between people, wealth, and territories" (p. 49). This is virtually identical to Fandy's definition of a hyperreal state.


-GGM

My Final Paper: Globalization, Deterritorialization, and Gender


            Throughout the semester, I found myself interested in certain parallels between the Muslim faith and contemporary Christianity. So for my final paper, I addressed some of these parallels. Specifically, I looked at the tension between conservative and progressive in both religions. I argue that the underlying source of tension arises from a twofold source: the notion of deterritorialization and corresponding conceptualizations of "context;" and people's perspectives on gender relations.


            The first half of this source of tension, deterritorialization, is used by Arjun Appadurai in his book Modernity at Large. It refers to "the loosening of the holds between people, wealth, and territories" (p. 49). In my paper, I argue that conservative strains of Islam and Christianity tend to shun the idea of deterritorialization. This tendency arises from how they conceptualize "context." Conservative Muslims seem to view "context" as the history of Western (i.e. non-Muslim) colonization of Muslim regions (e.g. the letters by Maryam Jameelah. Also see my blog post from 3/3/12, titled "Jameelah and Esack"). Conservative Christians – within the US – see "context" as the Judeo-Christian ideology upon which the US founded. For both these conservative groups, "context" has geopolitical overtones. Thus they do not deterritorialize; they do not separate religion from territory.


            Progressives, on the other hand, do embrace deterritorialization. They tend to view "context" in a geopolitical way, but in a sociocultural way. To them, "context" refers to the socio-cultural-historical setting in which the Quran/Bible was written (e.g. Farid Esack, On Being a Muslim).


            Gender relations is the second half of the source of conservative/progressive tension. In both Islam and Christianity, conservatives tend to embrace traditional/patriarchal gender roles, whereas progressives have a more egalitarian/feminist mindset (e.g. the letters by Maryam Jameelah).


            I draw two major conclusions in my paper. The first is that both conservatives and progressives – in both Islam and Christianity – have mixed religious and political motives. In particular, people's views on deterritorialization and "context" inform their views on gender relations. For example, because Esack takes into account the patriarchal sociocultural setting in which the Quran was written, he concludes that certain passages that may seem patriarchal today were actually radically egalitarian to their original audience (ch. 5). He argues that we should maintain the same spirit of movement – thus he reaches a progressive conclusion on issues of gender. And if this flow of influence occurs – if conceptualizations of deterritorialization and context influence view on gender issues – then politics influence ideology.


            The second major conclusion I draw is that Islam is not inherently misogynist. A dominant discourse in the West is that Islam is intrinsically sexist. But because the issue of gender relations is an underlying source of tension in both Christianity and Islam, Islam is not inherently more misogynist than Christianity. Both Christians and Muslims wrestle with the issue of gender relations, with some sects and individuals reaching conservative conclusions and others arriving at more progressive destinations. Therefore, analyzing Islam and Christianity within the frameworks of globalization, deterritorialization, and gender challenges the dominant discourse of Muslim misogyny.


-GGM

"Reciting Colonial Scripts" (Alkadry)


            In this post I will discuss the article "Reciting Colonial Scripts: Colonialism, Globalization and Democracy in the Decolonized Middle East" by Mohamad Alkadry. Here are a few things that I found particularly interesting:


·         First, the article argues that one of the reasons the Middle East has not fully democratized is the region's history of colonization. In his book Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, Arjun Appadurai reiterates this same belief. He writes that ethnicity ("ethnoscapes") is often more important than ideology ("ideoscapes") in distinguishing groups of people from one another. This topic that Alkadry addresses is also a common discourse among Westerners: the tendency to blame the lack of democracy in the Middle East on Islam, rather than historical interactions of exploitations. Thus, Alkadry's article challenges this dominant discourse.


·         Second, Alkadry's whole article reminds me of Alev Çinar's book Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey: Bodies, Places, and Time. Çinar addresses 1990s Turkey and talks about the fluctuating power plays between Turkey's original Ottoman-Islamic identity and the secular state. The secular state is an external force that imposed itself on the region. For example, they tried to strictly regulate various aspects of daily life, such as hijab use. This is very much like what colonizers do (which is the topic of Alkadry's article). Alkadry outlines four ways that colonialism has prevented democratization (p. 746). These reasons all involve somehow suppressing the pre-existing structures/movements and redirecting them to be loyal to the colonizer. This is exactly what Çinar talks about. For example, the secular state tried to forbid commemoration of Ottoman-Islamic festivals and instead created new holidays, thus manipulating citizens' conceptualizations of time to more align with the secular state's agenda. So Alkadry addresses many of the same issues that Çinar addresses.


·         Lastly, I found it perhaps ironic that globalization is seen as a threat to democratization in the Middle East. If democracy is a Western construct in the first place, then how would that idea spread to the Middle East? Isn't globalization actually necessary for this spread to take place? I suppose it depends on how you define globalization, and which "scapes" you consider it to encompass (Appadurai).


-GGM