The question of modernization within the context of
an Islamic society dates back to the 17th century. At its height, the Ottoman Empire represented
one of the most powerful political entities in world history. Stretching from the Maghreb to the Caspian
and from Hungry to Yemen, the Ottoman Empire dominated a territorially vast and
diverse domain. Especially after its
conquest of Constantinople and the Balkans, the casual observer would have considered
the Ottomans one of the world’s superpowers. Yet, all of this soon
changed. The small Christian kingdoms
that at one time were frightened of Ottoman influenced soon eclipsed the Turks. How did the powerful Ottoman Empire fall
behind to less significant states such as Britain or France? The answer was the European countries ability
to modernize/industrialize. The
discourse on modernity in the former Ottoman Empire bears ways in which Islam
can co-exist with the modern world.
Turkey,
the direct descendant of the Ottoman Empire, occupies a unique position
geographically, politically, and intellectually within the context of Islam and
modernity. Like the ideas of the
Enlightenment within the context of the foundation of the United States, the
foundation of Turkey was marked by ideas of modernity. To Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, the
Ottoman Empire collapsed because it did not modernize (or more accurately
modernize quick enough). Ataturk set out
to create a modern and secularized Turkish society from the top-down. In creating a secularized society, Ataturk
attempted to relegate Islam to the private sphere. Islamic laws and/or traditions were
attributed as Turkish (fitting within a strict concept of nationalism),
changed, or discouraged. An backlash
against Ataturk’s modernization reforms occurred later in the 20th
century with the rise of Islamism. Despite
the negative connotations that political Islam was within western discourse, the
Islamists are also seen as modernizing agents by historians such as Alev Cinar. In the context of Cinar’s definition of modernity,
both Ataturk and Islamism represent modernizing agents. For Cinar, modernity is defined as a need for
progress and change for a better future.
This is triggered by something wrong with the present. The heirs of Ataturk and Islamists agree that
something is wrong with their present society (although they certainly would
disagree on what). The major difference
is the new society they are hoping to achieve.
Turkish Islamists are certainly no less modern then their secularist
counterparts. Here is Islam and
modernity cooperating together. On face
value, it is different than the more secular modernity usually attributed to
the West (and Ataturk). But, it is
modernity nonetheless.
At
its height, the Ottoman Empire united almost all of what is considered today as
the Middle East. As Ottoman/Islamic
unity would not last forever, other modernists such as al-Afghani used this
unity as symbolism for the decay of the Islamic civilization. Al-Afghani advocated the unity of the Islamic
world and a return to the “true” Islam which he saw as equivalent to true reason. Despite advocating a return to an older
Islam, it would be incorrect to lump al-Afghani with fundamentalism or term him
as a reactionary. Al-Afghani was
concerned with the decay of Islamic society in the political, technological,
and moral spheres. Using Cinar’s
previous definition of modernity, al-Afghani was trying to progress society
(Islamic) towards a better future.
Al-Afghani is a modernist who looks greatly different from the Turkish
modernists (even among many Islamists).
If anything, al-Afghani shows a compatibility with Islam and modernity
in a completely different fashion.
BDF
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